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Abstract 
Avian/Bird flu is a viral disease of birds, caused by avian influenza virus (AIV). A highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 
H5N1 has breached the barrier of species to humans and other animals escalating the pandemic threat. If the H5N1 evolves 
to a human-to-human transmissible virus retaining its pathogenicity, it can trigger an influenza pandemic. H5N1 has a 
mortality rate of about 60%, varying with strains. Meaningful antigenic alteration in hemagglutinin (HA) and/or 
neuraminidase (NA) results in recurring pandemics. The HPAI H5N1 subtype alone has outreached more than 77 nations 
around the world since the first human case and death was reported in 1997. Wild and migratory birds are the AIV reservoirs. 
Poultry is primarily impacted by incidents and outbreaks of the disease. A wide range of serological and molecular methods 
have substantially aided in the identification of bird flu in humans. Candidate vaccines have been developed, yet are not 
ready for widespread use. Oseltamivir (brand name: Tamiflu) is the preferred drug for the management of human Influenza-
like illness (ILI). Surveillance, mass awareness, and pandemic preparedness abiding WHO recommendations are of 
paramount importance for the prevention of bird flu outbreaks. 
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Introduction 
The word ‘influenza’ has Italian origin meaning 
‘influence’; from the belief that epidemics were due to the 
influence of the stars [1]. It became a term for a particular 
disease after the 1743 epidemic. But, the virus was 
isolated from a human only in 1933 [2, 3]. Avian influenza 
virus (AIV), better known as bird flu, is a type-A 
influenza virus of the Orthomyxoviridae family. 
Theoretically, owing to the combination of antigens, 
hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA), type-A 
influenza comprises thousands of distinct antigenic 
subtypes [4]. To date, 18 subtypes of HA and 11 subtypes 
of NA have been identified, while two extra subtypes of 
HA and NA have been identified in bats [5, 6]. World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) defines AIV as “an 
infection of poultry by any influenza A virus, including 
by subtypes H5 and H7” [7]. OIE requires notification for 
all low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus 
outbreaks, i.e. H7 and H5 subtypes as they can mutate 
into highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses, as 
documented in some poultry outbreaks. Non-H5 and 
non-H7 LPAI are not deemed notifiable [8]. In certain 
poultry, such as ducks, some HPAI virus (e.g., H5N1) 
have been shown to cause no illness. HPAI has been 
associated with AIV subtypes H5 and H7, including the 
viruses H5N1, H7N7, and H7N3. Human infections have 
varied from moderate (H7N3, H7N7) to severe and lethal 
(H5N1) infections [9]. 
The HPAI H5N1 virus has raised concerns around the 
world as it threatens poultry, especially chickens; also it 
has shown the potential to pass from poultry to humans 
and caused severe infection and death [10]. The first 
reported human infection of H5N1 occurred in 1997 in 
Hong Kong [11]. The virus has been endemic in several 
countries after the re-emergence of H5N1 in Asia, Africa, 
the Pacific region, Europe, and the Middle East in 2003, 
and continues to cause poultry outbreaks [12]. In Dhaka, 
the presence of the H5N1 virus was confirmed in March 
2007 [13].  The first case of AIV was identified at a remote 
non-commercial poultry farm in Kakarvitta, Eastern 
Nepal, on January 16, 2009 in Nepal [14, 15].  More than 
256 H5N1 outbreaks has been witnessed in poultry since 
2009 [16]. 
Incidence and Prevalence 
Climate change can bring a quick ecosystem shift which 
alters the evolution and ecology of infectious diseases 
including AIV. This ecosystem shifts had played a 
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cumulative effect in the outbreak of the influenza 
pandemic in the past century [17]. Furthermore, studies 
show an increase in temperature of freshwater in 
temperate and Arctic regions had a persisting impact 
altering the suitable habitat variation in prevalence rate 
and viral spreading [18]. Several studies have posited 
agricultural system, poultry trade, availability of water 
temperature, salinity as factors resulting in an alteration 
of AIV ecology [19, 20]. Studies have shown that the 
occurrence of new AIVs is supported by either point 
mutation, partial genes recombination, or genetic re-
assortment of the whole genome. Most new strains of 
AIV evolved due to point mutations while genetic re-
assortment performs a key task in the genesis of H5N1 
and H7N9 strains [21]. The pathogenicity of AIV is 
associated with efficient virus replication. Host immune 
responses and the genetic markers are determinants for 
efficient virus replication [22]. The occurrence of human 
influenza A (H5N1) often parallels with massive 
outbreaks of avian H5N1 influenza A, while avian 
outbreaks in 2004 and 2005 have seldom led to human 
infection [23]. Different types of studies based on 
geographical distribution and outbreak of AIVs revealed 
that prevalence is related to the migratory route and 
stages of the itinerary of migrating birds [24, 25]. Studies 
have concluded that Asia is the prevalent continent for 
the avian influenza virus due to a unique ecosystem of 
various lakes, wetlands, creeks, and rivers that constitute 
migratory bird wintering areas [26]. Due to consequence 
and the risk represented to human health, AIV is of great 
concern and are widely studied in recent times. Wild 
birds of genera Antidae (ducks, geese, and swans) and 
Laridae (gulls, terns, and kittiwakes) have been in focus 
for decoding the epidemiological links between hosts and 
transmissions of AIV [27]. 
Etiology 
The pandemic influenza virus has its origins in avian 
influenza [28]. Its genomic material is composed of eight 
segmented negative strand RNAs. The influenza A virus 
shows external spikes when examined with an electron 
microscope. Various techniques can distinguish two 
kinds of spikes. The HA molecules made up one type and 
the NA molecules the other. There are roughly 5 times as 
many HA spikes as NA spikes [29] (Figure 1). The 18 
different subtypes of HA and 11 different subtypes of NA 
exist allowing for 198 potential different viral strains. As 
of 2019, only 131 subtypes have been detected in nature 
[30]. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the Influenza A virus with the 
virus components. Note: NA=neuraminidase, 
HA=hemagglutinin, M1=matrix protein-1, M2=matrix protein-
2, ss RNA=single stranded RNA, PB2=polymerase basic-2, 
PB1=polymerase basic-1, PA=polymerase acidic, 
NP=nucleoprotein, NS1=non-structural protein-1, NS2=non-
structural protein-2. 
Genomic variation 
Genetic analyses have indicated that since 1997 the H5N1 
virus has evolved into multiple genotypes [31]. Whether 
the genetic modifications in the HA protein are the result 
of immune escape or are related to host adaptation is not 
clear [32]. Hence, the best H5N1 epitopes is difficult to 
predict to target with vaccines without understanding 
the antigenicity of emerging strains. As H5N1 viruses 
have expanded their geographical and host ranges, it has 
become increasingly important to determine acquired 
features that permit successful human-to-human 
transmission. The transmission of H5N1 viruses to 
humans has been ineffective, arising either by direct 
interaction with infected poultry or through ingestion of 
undercooked meat or blood of infected birds [33]. In 
influenza A viruses, antigenic drift is a continuous 
mechanism where point mutations occurs during 
replication of the viral genome. This mechanism is 
apparent in all the influenza A virus gene products; 
however, it is most pronounced in the HA and NA 
glycoproteins’ antibody-binding sites. These mutations 
cannot be repaired because of the lack of a proofreading 
mechanism, and the resulting aggregation of variations 
in the amino acid sequence transforms these antigenic 
sites in such a way that they are less detectable by the host 
antibody response. Thus, these virus strains are naturally 
selected as host antibodies no longer no longer 
neutralized them, and they lead to increased viral fitness 
[34, 35]. 
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Antigenic Variation  
Both the HA and the NA undergo antigenic variation 
[36]. Antigenic shift is a major change in antigenicity, 
while antigenic drift is a minor change sufficient to spark 
a new outbreak. In the human population, pandemics 
happened in 1957 (Asian influenza) and 1968 (Hong 
Kong influenza); both are associated with the presence of 
antigenically transformed HA molecules. The HA 
antigenic variation is known to be more important 
quantitatively than that of the NA. The human pandemic 
virus of 1918 (Spanish influenza) was the common 
ancestor of human and classical swine H1N1 influenza 
virus [37, 38]. 
Epidemiology 
Avian flu or bird flu was initially known as Fowl Plague, 
and later Fowl Plague virus was discovered as an 
influenza virus. The outbreak of avian flu was first 
documented in 1878 in Italy. Later on, in 1924 and 1929 
two massive outbreaks in poultry were recorded in the 
United States [39]. Since the first reported human case 
and death by the influenza virus in 1997 in Hong Kong, 
the eruption of the disease has been documented from 
wild and domestic birds including humans. HPAI H5N1 
alone has been reported from over 77 countries [40, 41]. 
Till the date, a total of 860 human cases have been 
reported since 2003 with more than 50% deaths by 
H5N1[42]. Since 2013, 1,568 human cases and 616 deaths 
were reported worldwide attributed to the novel H7N9 
[43]. Geographically the disease is globally prevalent 
dominating the Asia continent showing the higher 
outbreaks in China, Vietnam, India, Taiwan, Israel, 
Japan, and South Korea [26]. 
Host range, transmission, and spread 
AIV is found distributed in a wide variety of hosts. 
Predominantly free-flying water birds, like geese, ducks, 
shorebirds, and gulls, are major reservoirs of AIVs. 
Besides this, AIV can infect both wild and domestic birds 
like chicken, turkeys, partridges, pheasants, quails, 
pigeons, and ostriches [44]. However, the AIVs primarily 
associated with transmission in chickens but not in ducks 
were found to be adapted to ducks by acquiring genes 
from duck influenza viruses [45]. AIV is essentially a 
disease of birds, but evidence has shown that the 
infection can be transmitted in cats, dogs, eagles, ferrets, 
hamsters, horses, humans, macaques, marine mammals, 
mice, minks, pigs, and tigers; but the zoonotic infection 
had been only reported in China [46]. The transmission 
and spread of disease were primarily related to poultry 
contact, yet human-to-human transmission is also 
possible [47]. Moreover, the outbreak of avian flu is also 
associated with the vicinity of water source and 97.5% of 
reported cases showed the proximity of water source 
[26]. 
Virus replication 
The influenza A virus genome consists of segmented 
RNA encoding 10 proteins [48]. These 10 viral proteins 
are necessary for a successful infection cycle within 
immuno-competent hosts. On the surface of the host 
cells, the HA protein binds to sialic acid, enabling the 
virus to enter [49]. The host cell endocytoses the virus 
particles. The endosome maturation lowers the pH 
triggering a HA conformational change. This results in 
the membrane fusion of the endosome and the virion. 
The viral matrix protein-2 (M2) acts as an ion channel that 
further lowers the pH of the virus particle. This aids in 
the dissociation of the matrix protein-1 (M1). The virus 
ribonucleoproteins (vRNPs), including polymerase basic-
1 (PB1), polymerase acidic (PA), and polymerase basic-2 
(PB2), are released into the cytosol [50]. For viral 
replication and transcription, the vRNPs are then moved 
into the host cell nucleus. The nuclear export protein 
(NEP) and M1 traffic out freshly produced vRNPs into 
the cytoplasm and then to the plasma membrane after 
replication, transcription, and protein synthesis. Several 
viral proteins, including M1 and M2, contribute to 
budding. Finally, in both the viral and host cell 
membrane, NA removes sialic acid from glycoproteins. 
This stops HA and host cells from interacting, releasing 
new infective virus particles [1]. Nonstructural protein 1 
(NS1) counteracts the innate host-cell defense within the 
infected cell, including interferon, for efficient virus 
replication [51]. New proteins generated by co-
transcription or co-translation with the host are being 
continuously identified [52]. 
Pathogenesis  
Virulence factors comprise the highly cleavable HA that 
several cellular proteases can activate, a specific 
substitution in the polymerase basic protein-2 enhances 
viral replication [53]. Non-structural protein-1 
substitution confers improved resistance to interferons 
and tumor necrosis factor-alpha inhibition [54]. The 
H5N1 viruses potently induce proinflammatory 
cytokines in macrophages, the most notable being tumor 
necrosis factor-alpha, which may contribute to the 
unusual severity in humans [55]. With antigenicity 
change [56], constellation of internal gene, expanded 
range of avian species [57], enhanced pathogenicity [58], 
and increased environmental stability, these viruses keep 
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evolving. Despite extensive exposure to infected poultry, 
comparatively low frequencies of H5N1 infection in 
humans suggest that the species barrier to acquisition of 
this avian virus is important [33].  
Disease in birds 
Avian flu has been reported in many wild and domestic 
birds. Chickens, ducks, swans, gooses, quails, crows, 
storks, etc. have been known to have been infected with 
AIV. It is understood that H5N1 infections show distinct 
clinical presentations in chickens and ducks. The 
infection is characterized by clinical signs and high 
mortality in chickens, whereas the infection is generally 
asymptomatic in ducks. This leads to an underestimation 
of the prevalence of the disease [59]. Infected ducks can 
thus help to sustain and spread the virus “silently” to 
other vulnerable hosts [60]. The H5N1 infection in ducks 
has been considered a threat to the poultry flock and 
public health due to its silent nature [57]. Thus, 
monitoring and surveillance based on ducks is 
substantial for AIV control [61]. Since ducks may become 
infected and co-infected with multiple AIVs, re-
assortment of the viral genes is likely [62]. Spatial 
evidence on HPAI outbreaks in Southeast Asia has 
shown that scavenging ducks lead to HPAI outbreaks in 
domestic poultry [63]. Evidence shows that ducks play a 
major role in the transmission of HPAI since they do not 
exhibit the disease symptoms. 
Characterization of virus  
In 1996, the HPAI H5N1 virus was found in Gundong 
province, China which was thought to have originated 
from the H5 virus in migratory birds through both drift 
and shift mutation mechanisms [64]. Since then the 
influenza virus in human cases has evolved and is 
classified in a different list based on hemagglutinin 
phylogeny known as a clade. This list of the clade is 
updated for continuous change [65]. There are 13 major 
clades in the list distinguished by the hemagglutinin gene 
of the H5N1 representative subtype of HPAI. These 
clades are determined by sequencing and measuring the 
average pairwise nucleotide distance (APD) [66]. These 
clades were further split by measuring the within-clade 
average pairwise distance to determine the sub-clade 
resulting in more than 32 clades or sub-clades [67]. 
Clade 0 comprises viruses that were first identified to 
cause human infections in Gundong province, China 
1996 (A/goose/Guandong/1/96 linage). In the early 
phase of epidemic (2004-2005), clade 1 viruses 
predominated in Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia, and 
clade 2.1 viruses are endemic in Indonesia. The clade 
2.1.3.2b was found to be restricted to a certain 
geographical area i.e. Java, Indonesia [68]. A major 
outbreak of H5N1 disease in migratory birds has been 
associated with clade 2.2 and the virus is distinct from Z 
genotype virus and was first detected in Russia, 
Kazakhstan and later spread, causing avian disease in 
Africa, Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, 
and human disease in western Africa, Asia, and the 
Middle East resulting pandemic in 77 countries [69].  In 
southern China, clade 2.3 has been dominant and has also 
been reported in adjacent countries.  Later on, clade 
2.3.2.1c was detected in Canada and Austria. Clade 7 was 
restricted to China and Vietnam in the year 2006-2009 
[70]. 
The pattern of viral replication 
The characterization of virologic course of AIV H5N1 is 
yet to be done. Many studies reported prolonged viral 
replication. AIV can be detected in nasopharyngeal or 
lower respiratory sites ranging from 1 to 16 days. 
Nasopharyngeal replication has been lower in humans as 
compared to lower respiratory tract replication [71]. AIV 
has also been documented to replicate in the 
gastrointestinal tract [72, 73]. The invasive infection has 
been documented in humans [72]. The HA cleavage site’s 
polybasic amino acid sequence is linked with visceral 
dissemination in birds [33]. 
Host immune response (Innate type) 
Despite widespread exposure to infected poultry, the 
comparatively low disease frequencies in humans 
illustrate the species barrier of AIV [33]. H5N1’s ability to 
infect birds or humans tends to be partially determined 
by the HA binding specificity. Generally, HAs of human 
strains of influenza virus preferentially bind sialic acids 
bound to the terminal galactose of the oligosaccharides 
on the cell surface by α 2,6 linkage (SA α 2,6), which is 
abundant in human respiratory epithelia [74]. The HA of 
avian strains, on the other hand, binds preferentially to α 
2,3-linked sialic acids (SA α 2,3). These linkages are 
common in the avian intestinal tract [75]. For host cell 
infection and the dissemination and virulence of 
influenza viruses, 
For host cell infection and the dissemination and 
virulence of influenza viruses, HA interaction with 
sialylated glycans on the cell surface is important [76]. 
Mutations altering the specificity of the receptor binding 
of avian viruses may be essential for avian to human 
crossover, and for enabling direct human-to-human 
transmission [77]. Pathogenesis of disease is contributed 
by the innate immune response [33]. Elevated blood 
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levels of interleukin-6, interleukin-8, interleukin-1 b, 
soluble interleukin-2 receptor, tumor necrosis factor 
(TNF), TNF-a, interferon-g, monokines induced by 
chemokines interferon-inducible protein 10, interferon-g, 
and monocyte chemoattractant protein 1 were observed 
in the fatal cases [71, 78]. Such responses can be attributed 
to the sepsis syndrome, acute respiratory distress 
syndrome (ARDS), and multiorgan failure. 
Corticosteroids are used to minimize such responses. 
Individuals developing specific humoral immune 
responses can survive [33]. 
Transmission 
Transmission of AIV occurs through direct contact via the 
inhalation of droplets and droplet nuclei. Transmission 
also occurs perhaps through indirect (fomite) contact and 
self-inoculation onto the upper respiratory tract or 
conjunctival mucosa [79]. The data is consistent with 
bird-to-human, potentially environmental-to-human, 
and limited human-to-human transmission to date. 
Animal to human transmission is mainly attributed to 
exposure to live ill poultry and butchering of birds [80]. 
In addition to plucking and preparing infected birds, 
handling of fighting cocks, handling poultry notably 
asymptomatic infected ducks, and eating of undercooked 
poultry or duck’s blood has also been proposed for 
transmission of AIV. Also, feeding tigers and leopards in 
zoos with raw, infected chickens has been proposed for 
transmission of AIV [81]. Human-to-human transmission 
has also been manifested in recent years. But no case of 
human-to-human transmission through aerosols of small 
particles or through social contact has been reported. 
Still, severe illness has been reported in clinicians 
exposed to an infected patient. The survival of H5N1 in 
the environment outlines the possible mode of 
transmission. Direct intranasal or conjunctival 
inoculation, and oral intake of contaminated water 
during swimming is the possible mode of transmission. 
Also, contamination of hand and subsequent self-
inoculation is the possible mode of transmission. The use 
of untreated poultry feces as fertilizer has increased the 
risk of environmental transmission [82]. 
Clinical features 
Incubation: 
The incubation period of H5N1 infection is 2–4 days after 
exposure to infected, sick, or dead poultry [83]. But 
incubation time can be prolonged up to 8 days [33, 84]. 
The degree of virus shedding during this time is still 
unknown [85-87]. 
Initial symptoms 
The most common and initial symptoms that appear after 
H5N1 infection is respiratory distress. Milder cases show 
uncomplicated flu-like illness [88]. Pneumonia is often of 
viral origin with no bacterial superinfection, but may 
differ from cases to cases [78]. Crackles on examination of 
the chest are also seen [89]. Other frequently occurring 
symptoms include a high fever with >38°C, sore throat, 
cough, shortness of breath, rhinorrhoea, etc. [33]. Some 
cases suffer from diarrhea, vomiting, and abdominal pain 
apart from typical clinical manifestation [90]. 
Conjunctivitis or upper respiratory infections are not 
common [87]. Further complication includes multi-organ 
failure like renal disorder, cardiac malfunction, and 
pulmonary hemorrhage. Reye’s syndrome, 
pneumothorax, ventilator-associated pneumonia, and 
ARDS are also seen in some cases [33]. Though central 
nervous system involvement is rare there are cases where 
convulsion and progressive coma are reported leading to 
the death if not treated on time [90, 91]. Two patients in 
Vietnam were detected with encephalitis only [92]. 
Clinical course 
A patient infected with H5N1 has a rapid clinical course, 
developing progressive lower respiratory tract disease 
and viral pneumonia. Mechanical ventilation may be 
needed depending upon the severity of the case [33]. 
ARDS following the multi-organ failure develops in 68% 
of patients within six days of disease onset [91]. The 
average duration from onset of disease to hospital 
admission is four days and from onset to death in critical 
cases is nine days [93]. Few cases of seropositive patients 
but without typical manifestation are also reported [94]. 
Mortality/Morbidity 
The mortality rate of H5N1 is significantly high and is at 
an alarming rate accounting for about 60% [42]. But the 
rate may increase up to 73% in the youth of the age group 
10-19 years followed by 18% in the age group 50 years 
[95]. The mortality rate was even 90% in severe cases [96].  
Most of the death cases are frequent with late admission 
[97, 98].  
Diagnosis  
Specimen for upper respiratory tract 
infections   
Nasal swab/nasal wash 
Polyester or Dacron swab is recommended with an 
aluminum or plastic shaft. The dry swab is inserted in the 
internal nares below the inferior turbinate. It is then 
allowed to absorb secretion for some time and is rotated 
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around the area before the withdrawal. The tip is then 
broken and dipped in viral transport media (VTM) vial. 
For nasal wash, physiological saline is used [99]. The 
patient is advised to close the pharynx by saying the letter 
“K” and the saline is introduced in nostrils one at a time 
with the head tilted backward and later the saline is 
collected in a cup or dish by tilting the head forward. The 
obtained wash is then mixed with the VTM [100]. 
Throat swabs 
A throat swab is considered to be the high yielding 
specimen for upper respiratory tract infections and 
should be obtained within three days after symptoms 
appeared for the best result [100]. By using the tongue 
depressor or blade, polyester or Dacron swab is gently 
rubbed several times in the posterior pharynx. The tip is 
then broken and dipped in a VTM vial [99]. 
Nasopharyngeal secretions  
A catheter with a mucus trap is inserted in nostrils. By 
use of a vacuum, the catheter is withdrawn with a 
rotating motion. After that, the catheter is flushed with a 
transport medium in a 1:2 ratio [99].  
Specimen for lower respiratory tract infections   
An endotracheal aspirate or bronchoalveolar lavage is the 
best specimen for lower respiratory tract illness. For 
increasing the potential of viral isolation, multiple 
specimens can be taken from multiple respiratory sites 
for at least two consecutive days [72]. 
Blood samples  
 Both acute and convalescent serum samples are 
recommended if feasible. Within the first 3-5 days after 
the onset of symptoms, acute serum samples should be 
taken. Convalescent serum samples collected after 3-4 
weeks would be of great use if collected in conjunction 
with acute samples [99, 101]. 
Other specimens 
It may be either plasma or rectal swab in diarrhea for the 
detection of viral. Spinal fluid/ tap is also preferred in the 
case of meningitis [100]. Autopsy specimens along with 
para-mortem biopsies are also recommended [28]. 
Transportation and storage of specimens 
VTM contains balanced salt solutions, a protein 
stabilizer, bovine albumin, and a spectrum of antibiotics 
to minimize bacterial and fungal growth. Non-phosphate 
based VTM is selected if the specimen is only suggested 
for the PCR test. The collected specimen is placed in VTM 
and refrigerated at 4°C or with refrigerated packs for 
transportation to the designated laboratories [100]. 
The clinical specimens should be well labeled and sent to 
the laboratory as soon as possible. If specimens cannot be 
processed, then it should be either stored at 4°C or frozen 
at ≤-70°C. Samples should not be repeatedly freezed0 and 
thawed [102]. In the case of viral antigen detection by 
immunofluorescence staining, specimen processing 
should be done as soon as possible not more than 1-2 
hours after collection [83]. A guide for field operations is 
recommended regarding the collection, storage, 
processing, and even transportation of samples for H5N1 
detection [100]. 
Laboratory diagnosis 
Since most of the respiratory infections show similar 
manifestations, H5N1 can only be diagnosed in account 
with endemic areas and contact with dead or infected 
poultry or with confirmed cases. 
Direct detection of virus or viral antigen 
Virus isolation or reverse transcriptase PCR (RT-PCR) 
Virus isolation is considered to be the gold standard 
method and can be carried out in the laboratory either by 
inoculation of embryonated eggs or by using cell lines 
like Mardin-Darby Canine Kidney (MDCK). The 
obtained viral isolate can be later used for the study of 
pathogenicity, antiviral resistance, and DNA sequencing 
and analysis. But culture needs a biosafety level 3 (BSL-
3) which is not available at ease. So, RT-PCR is used as 
the first diagnostic tool in contrast to culture [85, 86]. 
Real-time PCR or quantitative PCR (qPCR) 
qPCR methods are preferred to conventional RT-PCR. 
There is a panel of qPCR assays covering even the specific 
detection of different NA genes and HA subtypes like H5, 
H3, and H1. H5 and N1 specific primers are used as they 
exclude false-negative results due to mutation in genes 
[72, 103]. Loop-mediated isothermal amplification 
(LAMP) tests are no longer in use [104, 105]. 
Serology 
The Antigen detection 
For the detection of viral antigens by using specific 
monoclonal antibodies against H5 and N1 direct 
immunofluorescence and enzyme immunoassay (EIA) 
are commonly used. The EIA method is considered 
simple, convenient, sensitive, and even applicable as 
Point of Care testing (POCT). The sensitivity of EIA is 
1,000-folds low compared to viral isolation. Thus, 
subtype-specific diagnostic methods like RT-PCR should 
be carried out simultaneously [106].   
Antibody detection 
Since seroconversion is delayed and needs paired sera, 
antibody detection provides a retrospective scenario of 
infection. It can be done by detecting a four-fold rise 
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while comparing acute and convalescent sera. 
Hemagglutination Inhibition (HI) assay is conventional 
yet the preferred method. But HI has low sensitivity for 
the detection of subtype-specific antibodies [107-109]. 
The use of horse erythrocytes while detecting antibodies 
against H5N1 shows effective results [110]. One of the 
studies done in 1997 during the Hong Kong outbreak 
reported similar results and reported that the micro-
neutralization test is more effective, reliable, and 
sensitive as compared to HI [111]. Western blot analysis 
with recombinant H5 is also done for the conformation 
[112-114]. 
Hematological Profile  
It includes leukopenia, relative lymphopenia, and even 
thrombocytopenia. Disseminated intravascular 
coagulation occurs but is rare [33, 84]. 
Biochemical parameters 
Levels of liver enzymes are elevated, along with lactate 
dehydrogenase and creatinine kinase, serum glutamate 
oxaloacetate transaminase (SGOT) and serum glutamate 
pyruvate transaminase (SGPT) [85, 86].  
Others 
Blood culture, sputum culture, and CSF analysis are 
carried out in case of serious complications. Chest X-ray 
reveals effusions, multifocal consolidation, 
lymphadenopathy, and even shows diffuse ground-glass 
appearance as in the case of ARDS [71, 78]. 
Differential diagnosis 
Diagnosis of AIV should be differentiated with atypical 
pneumonia, community-acquired pneumonia (CAP), 
corona-virus disease 2019 (COVID-19), endemic 
respiratory infections, hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, 
middle east respiratory syndrome (MERS), pediatric 
pneumococcal infections, pneumococcal infections 
(Streptococcus pneumoniae), respiratory syncytial virus 
infection, seasonal influenza, and severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) [83, 94, 115]. 
Definition of exposures to poultry and 
humans 
Human exposure definition differs from the 
environments and the situation (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Definition of exposures to poultry and humans [116]. 
Exposure to live poultry in occupations 
 Poultry-related exposure at workplace (e.g., persons 
engaged with poultry raising, trafficking, selling, and 
quarantine) within 2 weeks of the start of symptoms 
Exposure to poultry at live bird markets 
 Visiting a live poultry or bird wholesale or retail market 
within 2 weeks before the start of symptoms 
Exposure to sick or dead poultry 
 Close or direct physical contact with infected or dead 
poultry or poultry products (e.g., meat) or feces within 2 
weeks before the start of symptoms 
Exposure to backyard poultry 
 Close or direct contact with poultry raised in the backyard 
within 2 weeks before the start of symptoms 
Any exposure to poultry 
 Close or direct or indirect contact to healthy, or sick, or dead 
poultry (including birds-e.g., chickens, ducks, geese, pet 
birds, pigeons) in live bird markets, or backyards, or farms, 
or neighborhoods, or consumption of improperly processed 
poultry products 
Exposure through patient contact 
 A patient with a history of close contact within 2 weeks 
before the start of symptoms with a person with a confirmed 
or suspected influenza H5N1 virus infection (at any time 
from the day before the onset of symptom to death, or 
during the period during which the patient was 
hospitalized) 
Case definitions [117, 118] 
For prompt diagnosis and treatment, WHO has defined 
H5N1 infection as: 
Person under investigation  
A person who is decided to be investigated for possible 
H5N1 infection by assigned public health authorities  
Suspected H5N1 case 
A person with fever (>38ºC) exhibiting unexplained acute 
lower respiratory distress along with cough, shortness of 
breath, or dyspnoea.  
AND 
In the 7 days prior to symptom onset, one or more of the 
following exposures: 
a) Contact with a person within 1-meter distance during 
caring, speaking, or touching whether s/he is a 
suspected, probable, or confirmed H5N1 case. 
b) Exposure either to poultry in an area suspected or 
confirmed with H5N1 infections not more than a 
month or wild animals during handling, slaughtering, 
de-feathering, etc. and even contact with the 
contaminated feces. 
c) Intake of poultry products raw or undercooked in an 
area where animal or human H5N1 infections is 
reported or confirmed in the past month. 
d) Close contact with an animal infected with confirmed 
H5N1 other than poultry or wild birds (e.g. cat or pig)  
e) Handling animal or human samples in a laboratory or 
other facility suspected of having the H5N1 virus. 
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Probable H5N1 case (notify WHO) 
Probable definition 1: 
A person who satisfies the conditions for a suspected 
case   
AND  
Additional one of the following criteria: 
a) Infiltrates or proof of acute chest radiograph 
pneumonia, with proof of respiratory failure 
(hypoxemia, severe tachypnea)  
OR  
b) Confirmed laboratory influenza A infection but 
inadequate evidences in laboratory. 
Probable definition 2: 
A person dying from an unidentified acute respiratory 
illness who is known to be epidemiologically linked to a 
probable or confirmed case of H5N1 by time, place, and 
exposure. 
Confirmed H5N1 case (notify WHO) 
A person who satisfies the condition of a suspected 
or probable case  
AND  
Either of the following findings in a national, regional, or 
international laboratory of influenza whose H5N1 test 
results are recognized as confirmatory by WHO: 
a) H5N1 virus isolation;  
b) H5 PCR positive by tests using two separate 
targets of PCR, e.g. influenza A and H5 HA 
specific primers; 
c) On test of an acute serum sample (collected 7 days 
or less after the start of symptom) and a 
convalescent serum sample, the H5N1 
neutralization titer must be at least fourfold rise. 
The convalescent neutralizing antibody titer must 
also be at least 1:80; 
d) In a single serum sample collected at day 14 or 
later after the start of symptom a 
microneutralization H5N1 antibody titer must be 
at least 1:80 and a positive in a different 
serological assay, for e.g. titer of at least 1:160 in a 




H5N1 can be a serious disease in humans that needs 
hospitalization, isolation, and intensive care [119]. 
Antiviral agents 
The primary therapy is the use of antiviral medication. 
The WHO and CDC guidelines (2015) recommend use of 
a neuraminidase inhibitor [92]. 
Amantadine 
Amantadine interferes with M2 protein and affects the 
release of infectious viral nucleic acid [120]. It is found to 
be effective for both prophylaxis and short-term 
treatment [121]. Since most of the H5N1 virus shows 
resistant patterns to amantadine or rimantadine, 
combination therapy with oseltamivir is recommended 
[92]. 
Rimantadine (brand name: Flumadine) 
It inhibits uncoating affecting viral replication. But H5N1 
develops resistance to it [92]. 
Oseltamivir (brand name: Tamiflu) 
It affects the receptor of host cells towards viral HA [92]. 
But the spread of oseltamivir-resistant H5N1 from 2007 
to 2009 surprised the influenza community [122]. Failures 
of treatment have been reported in single-drug 
oseltamivir regimens due to resistance. There are current 
researches on the relative success of high-dose and/or 
extended oseltamivir treatment courses [83]. If the use of 
high-dose tends to be more effective, it will affect the 
supply of antiviral drugs in the case of a large epidemic, 
in addition to medical considerations for patients who are 
moderately or seriously ill [92]. 
Zanamivir (brand name: Relenza) 
In an animal model, it shows better results but has not 
been tested in humans. But in severe cases, inhaled 
zanamivir may not be able to reach the distal airways [83, 
92].  
Uricosuric Agents 
Probenecid can be used as adjunctive therapy [92]. But no 
study has been carried out to confirm the suitable dose. 
Studies are still going on other drugs like arbidol and 
peramivir [123].  
Immunomodulators 
Low dose corticosteroids are used to treat acute lung 
injury (ALI)/ARDS caused due to H5N1 [83, 124]. But the 
long term and high dose use may result in serious 
complications increasing the probability of opportunistic 
infections [92]. Other immunomodulators used are non-
steroid anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs), antipyretics, 
growth hormones, etc. But the use of such intervention 
modalities has not been proven any significant benefits 
[125, 126]. 
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Miscellaneous supportive therapy in a critical case 
These include oxygen therapy, ventilatory support [127], 
and non-ventilatory treatments for ALI/ARDS [128]. 
Prevention and control 
Immunization 
Based on different studies, three vaccines of H5N1 were 
licensed as Sanofi Pateur's vaccine, (monovalent killed 
vaccine approved by the US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), United States), Glaxo Smith 
Kline's vaccine-Prepandrix (approved by the European 
Union), and CSL Limited's vaccine-Panvax (approved by 
Australia) [129-131]. Even though none of the vaccines 
are available for the civilians yet [132]. Since the egg 
inoculation method is not applicable, tissue or cell culture 
and recombinant viruses are used for the production of 
vaccine and the adjuvants like aluminum hydroxide can 
be used to increase immunogenicity [133]. The 
inactivated vaccines produced by using the H5N1 was 
found to be immunogenic with high doses of HA [134]. 
But due to rapid mutation, immunization is not quite 
effective and practicable [135]. For travelers, prophylaxis 
by antiviral is not recommended, instead avoiding 
contact with dead birds and poultry, use of properly 
cooked food, and if needed use of N95 respirator mask, 
goggles while traveling in outbreak areas is 
recommended [136]. 
Disease management for preventing outbreaks 
The most effective way to prevent an outbreak is to avoid 
the source of exposure. People should avoid contact with 
the wild as well as suspected domestic birds and even 
should avoid contact with contaminated feces or surface. 
Active surveillance and strengthening biosecurity done 
in poultry workers, animals, and the environment in 
suspected sites contribute to a great extent. [136]. One 
health concept or collaboration of different sectors play a 
vital role in early detection and prevention. Proper 
supervision of animal transportation, inspection on the 
border while transporting, and provision of isolation 
stations on different sites play a vital role [137]. Skilled 
manpower in the field of veterinary to help with 
identifying the diversity and emerging disease will help 
in early warning [136]. Stamping-Out, proper carcass 
disposal, and surveillance and monitoring of animal 
health are needed [138]. Minimizing the occupational risk 
of exposure and vaccination of exposed poultry workers 
and animals should be prioritized [136]. 
Pandemic preparedness 
Pandemic preparedness can be implemented effectively 
only if it is planned by a collaboration of global, federal, 
and state or local levels. It requires the involvement of 
public health personnel, different health care 
professionals, researchers, and even private sectors to 
prepare effective measures for pandemic situations. 
Thus, the instant response becomes possible that will 
help to tackle the pandemic scenario in a relevant way 
[139]. Pandemic preparedness includes mass 
surveillance, continuous monitoring, early diagnosis, 
formulation of triage policies [140], development and 
distribution of different medical interventions like 
therapeutics, personal protective equipment (PPE), the 
rapid response of health care system, and proper 
interaction [139].  
Precautionary measures for general publics 
As a general precaution, avoiding contact with suspected 
wild birds, contaminated poultry products, 
contaminated water, and proper hand hygiene is 
recommended for the public. Besides, awareness 
programs on the public level regarding the transmission 
and different preventive measures should be made 
available by the government [136, 138].  
Hospital infection control  
Specific measures taken in a hospital setting not only 
protect the health care workers but also guide them to 
control the infection that in turn prevents the spread of 
disease in the community. Health workers must ensure 
the environment cleaning, proper disinfection and must 
be trained about occupational hazards and various 
modes of virus transmission [141].  N95 masks are more 
effective than multiple surgical masks. Pre-exposure 
prophylaxis should be considered if there is evidence of 
transmission of the virus or likely to be at risk of exposure 
[33, 142]. Chemoprophylaxis by oseltamivir is 
recommended for a person at high risk. The appropriate 
dose is 75mg of oseltamivir, a single dose for 7-10 days 
[143, 144]. 
Household and close contacts 
There are many routes of transmission for the H5N1 virus 
as such there are different protective measures to avoid 
the infection. Proper handwashing plays a significant 
role in avoiding the self-inoculation of the virus, thus 
preventing the disease [145]. Besides, households with 
illness should follow extra specific measures of post-
exposure chemoprophylaxis that include oseltamivir 
[146, 147]. 
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Table 3. Major events related to avian influenza in Nepal 
[16, 42, 150-154]. 
Time Major events 
2004 Surveillance of influenza started from Jhapa, 
eastern Nepal. 
Oct 2005 First report of serologic evidence of AIV 
infection (H9N2) in poultry in Nepal. 
2009 Domestic ducks seropositive for antibodies 
against H5 and H9, but not H7. 
2009 With the deployment of Real-Time PCR (qPCR) 
at the National Public Health Laboratory 
(NPHL), a molecular diagnostic assay-based 
influenza surveillance was initiated. 
Jan 2009 The first case of H5N1 detected in the Jhapa 
district, eastern Nepal 
Jun 2009 During the 2009 pandemic influenza virus 
outbreak, detection and molecular 
characterization of pandemic influenza virus A 
H1N1 in a human specimen obtained at 
Tribhuvan International Airport. 
Oct 2009 In Kathmandu valley, the community spread of 
pandemic H1N1 2009 was identified. 
Apr 
2010 
Highly equipped National Influenza Centre was 
established at NPHL. 
Apr 
2011 
For the isolation and characterization of 
influenza and parainfluenza viruses, the Madin 
Darby Canine Kidney (MDCK) cell line was 
successively cultured and propagated at NPHL. 
  
Jun 2011 From a clinical specimen obtained and stored at 




The NPHL isolated and characterized a total of 
28 influenza viruses and sent them to the WHO 
Collaborating Centre (WHOCC), National 
Institute of Infectious Diseases, Japan. 
Mar 
2019 
The first human death by H5N1 in Nepal. 
Avian influenza in the context of Nepal 
Epidemiology and outbreaks history 
Nepal had not observed HPAI H5N1 until 2009, although 
adjoining India and China reported several episodes of 
outbreaks. In Jhapa, a district bordering India and close 
to Bangladesh, the first HPAI outbreak was identified in 
January 2009. Although Nepal has undergone sporadic 
HPAI outbreaks since January 2009, until January 2012, 
no clinical outbreaks were identified in the capital city of 
Kathmandu. As per the National Agriculture census 
2011, Nepal has a population of domestic poultry of 
around 53.6 million birds (Table 2). The 45% of this 
poultry are commercial birds and 55% are backyard 
birds. In Chitwan and Kathmandu Valley, the majority of 
the layers and broilers are raised. There were an 
estimated 58 hatcheries and 800 poultry producers in 
Nepal [148]. Most of the parent stocks are imported to 
Nepal from foreign countries. Occasional HPAI 
outbreaks has occurred in some of these stocks. In most 
of these countries, parent flocks are, however, subjected 
to strict biosecurity measures and national HPAI 
surveillance. It is extremely unlikely that parent stocks 
are contaminated with the HPAI virus. The import from 
Tibet is negligible. However, smuggling from India poses 
a greater risk of HPAI infected parent stock across the 
border. Also, there are minimal biosecurity practices 
across the industry, and migratory wild birds also use the 
same bodies of water used by domestically raised ducks. 
With arrays of wildlife reserves and national parks, 
migratory birds and wild birds often visit the water 
bodies in Nepal [149].  
TFigure 2: Map of Nepal showing risk districts and wild water 
bird zones. Level of risk as represented by a different color: 
Black color represents the 27 high-risk districts, blue color 
represents the 18 medium-risk districts, white color represents 
the 32 low-risk districts, 6 green bubbles represent the wild 
water bird zones [Figure adapted from Reference 149].  
Based on the national HPAI surveillance plan, 
Kathmandu and Chitwan are identified as high-risk 
disease areas in Nepal (Figure 2). The high-risk 
designation is based on the higher commercial poultry 
density, the higher poultry influx from other districts,  




Laying hens 7,907,468 
Laying ducks 174,978 
Meat Weight in metric tonnes 
Chickens 40,346 
Ducks 217 
Eggs Numbers in 1000 
Hens 788,310 
Ducks 13,060 
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the larger free-ranging ducks, the larger natural and man-
made ponds and lakes visited by migratory birds 
annually, the existence of live bird markets, and the lower 
bio-security of commercial poultry farms [16, 153]. Since 
the first outbreak of 2009, 256 outbreaks have been 
reported to OIE by Nepal. Outbreaks peaked during 2012 
followed by silent 4 years. Outbreaks have been 
resurgent in recent years. Most of the infected population 
includes commercial broilers and commercial layers 
(Table 4) (Figure 3) [16]. Recently Epidemiology and 
Disease Control Division, Ministry of Health and 
Population confirmed the first human death by H5N1 on 
2nd May 2019. The 21 years old male was admitted on 24th 
March 2019 and died on 29th March 2019. It has been the 
first and the only case of identified human death by 
H5N1 infection in Nepal [42, 154]. 
Isolation and study of influenza in 
human/birds/poultry 
National Influenza Centre at National Public Health 
Laboratory (NPHL) is currently recognized by WHO and 
so is a member of the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance 
Network. Initially, influenza viruses were detected in 
suspected cases by Rapid Diagnostic Test (RDT), but now 
qPCR is employed. The center is primarily focused on 
collecting appropriate clinical specimens from patients, 
storing, transporting, and processing. Initial 
identification of virus type and subtype is done and 
isolates are forwarded to the WHO Collaborating Centre 
for Reference and Research on Influenza and alert the 
WHO Global Influenza Programme [152].  
Figure 3. Map showing avian influenza outbreak clusters since 
2009 in Nepal and its periphery [Figure adapted from Reference 
155]. 
To date, 256 outbreaks have been reported by Nepal to 
OIE. Besides these notifications, several surveillance 
studies have been done in a bird population in Nepal. The 
first report of serologic evidence of AIV infection in 
poultry in Nepal was reported in October 2005 which was 
later determined to be the H9N2 subtype. This was clear 
evidence of the introduction of the virus in Nepal before 
2005. The antibodies to influenza A were detected in the 










14-Feb Makwanpur Birds Commercial layers 9,769 41,125 
28-Feb Kathmandu Birds Layers 2,600 2,600 
06-Nov Bhaktapur Birds Commercial broilers 1,535 3,961 
17-Mar Kathmandu Birds House crow 200 0 
2018 3 
03-May Chitwan Birds Commercial layers 1,500 12,091 
20-May Kathmandu Birds Ducks 270 240 
2017 4 
17-Feb Kaski Birds Chicken and ducks 98 297 
01-Mar Sunsari Birds Commercial layers 3,650 2,550 
02-Mar Sunsari Birds Swans and storks 15 0 
2016 0 - - - - 0 0 
2015 0 - - - - 0 0 
2014 1 13-Feb Sunsari Birds Commercial layers 570 1,430 
2013 0 - - - - 0 0 
2012 210 27-Aug Lalitpur Birds Commercial layers 2,500 0 
2011 13 10-Nov Bhaktapur Birds Chicken and ducks 88 308 
2010 8 
26-Jan Kaski Birds Chicken and ducks 153 11,128 
25-Oct Chitwan Birds Commercial poultry 66 11,437 
2009 2 08-Jan Jhapa Birds Poultry 14 24,689 
Total 256     23,028 111,856 
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chicken while ducks and pigeons were still serologically 
negative for the virus. This also outlines the absence of 
HPAI and notifiable H5 and H7 subtypes until that time. 
This also proved the brewing adaptation and 
introduction of another influenza A viruses in Nepal 
[150]. H5 subtype was not detected in 2007 by the RT-
PCR test in suspected dead birds [156]. Similarly, 
domestic ducks were found seropositive for antibodies 
against H5 and H9 but not against H7 in 2009. Though 
none of the seropositive ducks were symptomatic for 
HPAI or LPAI virus infection [151]. H9N2 was reported 
in a fecal sample of migratory birds in southern Nepal. 
However, H7N9 and other HPAI viruses were not 
detected [157]. Different studies reported pandemic 
H1N1 in Nepal [158, 159]. Pandemic H1N1 detected in 
Nepal was the lineage of the novel influenza H1N1 virus 
(A/California/07/2009) [159]. 
HPAI virus has been a major threat to the Nepalese 
poultry industry since its outbreak in India in 2003. A 
substantial number of customers temporarily stopped 
buying chicken meat and switched to other sources of 
meat. The loss to entire value chain actors was estimated 
at NRs 1,154 million per year ($1=NRs. 73.06, the average 
exchange rate from 2001 to 2010) [160] from 2001 to 2010 
[161]. Since the 2009 outbreak, the impacts have spilled 
across the country. The economic loss is even 
devastating. Loss of more than NRs 4.5 million has been 
attributed to the Pokhara bird flu outbreak alone, the 
third outbreak in Nepal. The commercial and backyard 
farmers including butchers on a small scale are primarily 
affected by the outbreak. Nepal government had tried to 
compensate for the loss during the outbreak, but the 
compensation offered is lower as compared to the gate 
price of the poultry and products [161, 162]. 
Outbreak Preparedness in Nepal 
A pandemic imposes an increased pressure on 
infrastructures to contain the disease, be it a developed 
nation or a developing nation. Developing nations face 
much more stress in resource mobilization which in the 
case is already scarce. But in global context, pandemic 
help to better understand the disease and effects of 
preventive measures. Pandemic preparedness includes 
the holistic approach from virologists, epidemiologists, 
animal and human health professionals, military and 
paramilitary forces, press, media, and administrations. 
Continuous coordination among all parties is warranted 
for the execution of swift countermeasures in case of a 
new pandemic outbreak. But as is the case in most 
developing countries, this co-ordination is still lacking in 
Nepal [163]. Besides this, AIV is dynamically evolving 
and adapting to newer hosts so there is still the need to 
establish tests that are quick and easy to use to 
characterize new influenza strains [164]. Cross country 
movements of birds and products should strictly follow 
OIE recommendations. Farms should be designed to 
minimize the interaction with wild bird populations and 
there should be maximum biosecurity practices [165-
167]. 
Public awareness level about the disease in 
Nepal 
Different studies reported that most of the Nepalese 
population were aware of AIV and that poultry workers 
were at risk of infection. Televisions, radios, newspapers, 
and social media had been conveying the message to the 
general population about AIV. However, on preventive 
measures, only hand washing was widely accepted by 
most folks even though the majority of the population 
was familiar with most of the preventive behaviors. Thus, 
there is a strong degree of acceptance of many specific 
government regulation policies in public. But the 
implemented control measures were not considered 
sufficient even though preventive measures are 
frequently conveyed by the government (Table 4) [168, 
169]. 
Policy in controlling outbreaks in Nepal 
Between 2007 and 2011, the World Bank-funded the AIV 
surveillance and awareness campaign as the Avian 
Influenza Control Project (AICP) in Nepal. Since 2011, 
Nepal has continued the AICP with its internal resources. 
The management program focuses largely on outbreak-
associated culling of poultry in tandem with washing and 
disinfection. control policy is mainly focused on the 
Table 4: Excerpt of the preventive measures released by the 
Ministry of Health and Population, Nepal in the public 
interest [154]. 
Frequent hand washing using soap. 
Personal hygiene and cleanliness. 
Environmental cleanliness. 
Avoid close contact with sick poultry and wild birds. 
Immediately visit nearby health institutions on suspicion of 
ill birds or persons in the vicinity. 
Keep children far away from dead and sick birds. 
Safe handling and personal safety should be considered 
while preparing poultry meat. 
The handler should clean hands and tools after preparing 
meat. 
Consume only well-prepared poultry meat (cooked to at 
least 70ºC). 
Don’t do drugs without consultation with physicians. 
Avoid close contact with dead birds or their droppings. Bury 
the dead birds carefully if found. 
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outbreak-related culling of poultry in conjunction with 
cleaning and disinfection. However, despite of current 
AICP, the continuing incidence of outbreaks has raised 
concerns about the effectiveness of the money expended. 
Poultry and product export from Nepal is negligible. But 
domestic demand is nearly self-sufficient, though parent 
stocks and vaccines are imported. Thus, it is crucial to 
preserve the poultry industries as a pandemic can wipe 
out the industry owing to the small geography of the 
country. Thus, AICP alone cannot be fully relied upon, 
instead, the vaccination control program can be 
implemented along with bio-security, as proven effective 
in Pakistan [170]. Nevertheless, there is always a 
possibility of the circulation of the asymptomatic virus 
and the future spread of infection [171]. 
Control and management strategies in Nepal 
The control and management of AIV are primarily 
focused on outbreak zone/s in Nepal. Once the outbreak 
is identified, the area is sealed and poultry production is 
banned for 45 days. Surveillance is intensified in the 
proximity of epidemic regions and other regions at 
higher risks. The suspected poultry are quarantined and 
culled. Since the first outbreak, 111,856 poultry have been 
killed to control the further spread. Thus, occasional 
outbreaks in different areas have seriously hampered the 
poultry industry (Table 2). The control and management 
strategies are thus targeted to outbreak areas only after 
the outbreak has been identified, rather than focusing on 
surveillance and adopting preventive measures in the 
outbreak prone and high-risk areas. The control 
measures were adopted by Nepal to curb AIV outbreaks, 
as reported to OIE (Table 5).  
Table 5. Measures taken by Nepal to curb AIV outbreaks 
(as reported to OIE). 
Control of movement in the country 
Surveillance outside containment and/or protection zone 




Official destruction of animal products 




No treatment of affected animals 
Conclusion 
More than 20 years ago, H5N1 in humans was first 
identified. The reservoirs and key sources of human 
H5N1 infections are infected birds. Human-to-human 
transmission is very low and initial manifestations of 
illness are non-specific so detailed histories along with 
possible travel in endemic areas should be considered for 
case detection. Outbreaks have been recurrent in recent 
years in Nepal. Commercial rapid antigen tests are 
insensitive and only suitable for screening. Confirmatory 
diagnosis can only be done by molecular techniques. 
Oseltamivir has been warranted for the treatment of 
severe cases. The understanding of epidemiology, 
natural history, and human H5N1 disease control is still 
inadequate; thus, warranting the need for co-ordination 
in clinical and epidemiological research among 
institutions globally. 
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